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ABSTRACT
Xu, Huiqi. M.S., Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Wright State University, 2012.
kNN-R: Building Secure and Efficient Outsourced kNN Query Service with the RASP encryption.

With the wide deployment of public cloud computing infrastructures, outsourcing database services to the cloud has become an appealing solution to save operating expense.
However, some databases might be so sensitive or precious that the data owner does not
want to move to the cloud unless the security is guaranteed. On the other hand, a secure
outsourced service should still provide efficient query processing and significantly reduce
the inhouse workload to fully realize the benefits of outsourcing. We summarize these key
features for an outsourced service as the CPEL criteria: data Confidentiality, query Privacy,
Efficient query processing, and Low inhouse workload. Bearing the CPEL criteria in mind,
we propose an encryption called RASP to provide query services for range query and k nearest neighbors in secure outsourced databases. In the RASP encryption, data confidentiality
and query privacy are guaranteed when applying it for range query and kNN. Efficient query processing is achieved by two aspects: (1) all encrypted data can be indexed to speedup
query processing using RTree; (2) The protocol for k nearest search in outsourced databases can find high precision kNN results, which also minimizes costs between the cloud
server and the inhouse client. High precision kNN results and minimized interactions result
in low inhouse workload. In addition, we have conducted a thorough security analysis on
data confidentiality and query privacy.
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1

Introduction

Outsourcing data-intensive services to service providers is increasingly popular with the
great advantages of saving hardware and software maintenance cost. Range query and k
nearest neighbors (kNN) search on large-scale databases are the important data services
to many applications, from location-based services (LBS) [19], machine learning [18], to
similarity search in multimedia database [25]. Once the kNN query service is outsourced,
data confidentiality and query privacy become the important issues, because the data owner
loses the control over the data. Adversaries, such as curious service providers, will try to
breach the content of the database or intercept users’ queries to breach users’ privacy, especially when the queries are location queries [19, 9]. This security requirement dramatically
increases the complexity of constructing a practical outsourced database services.
Let’s study a typical application scenario of location-based services. The LBS service provider purchased a location database to serve authorized users’ queries for either range query
or k nearest neighbors search. Now the LBS service provider plans to use the cloud infrastructure, such as Amazon EC2, to reduce the cost of its service, but the service provider
does not want any unauthorized party to use their location database. Considering the cloud
provider may passively eavesdrop the data flow, the LBS service provider needs to come
up with a solution that meets the following criteria: (1) the confidentiality of the outsourced data should be protected from attacks; (2) the privacy of users’ queries needs to be
preserved; (3) queries should be efficiently processed by the cloud server to accommodate
possibly large query traffic; (4) the LBS service provider’s inhouse infrastructure (it is the
client to the outsourced service) should take low responsibility in helping the server process queries, so that the goal of cost reduction is achieved. We name them CPEL criteria:
data Confidentiality, query Privacy, Efficient query processing, and Low inhouse workload.
These criteria are also general to all kinds of outsourced services. Some related approaches
have been developed to address the problem of outsourced kNN services. However, they
do not achieve a good balance on these four criteria. We have summarized the weaknesses

1

of these approaches in Related Work (Section 6).
To achieve better CPEL criteria for the kNN service, we propose RASP encryption that
builds our outsourced databases to process range queries and k nearest neighbors search.
The key components include (1) the server-side efficiency and secure query processing;
and (2) the data confidentiality and query privacy guaranteed by the RASP encryption.
This approach has a number of unique features.
• The outsourced data is encrypted with the RASP encryption showing resilience to
various types of attacks on both the outsourced data and queries.
• The query services for range query and k nearest neighbors search can be implemented with indexed outsourced data - a unique benefit of the RASP encryption.
Index-aided query processing guarantees the performance.
• The kNN-R query processing also guarantees 100% recall and high precision around
50%. In addition, this high precision is not subject to the change of the user defined
level of confidentiality and privacy, which is a nice property that other approaches
such as Casper [19] do not offer. High precision guarantees the low workload of
inhouse post-processing.
We have evaluated our approach in experiments. The results show its unique advantages on
the CPEL criteria over other related approaches.
In Section 2 we introduce the system architecture of our outsourced databases, give the
definition of RASP encryption and analyse the threat model for data attacks. In Section 3
we describe the algorithm of processing range query on RASP-encrypted databases. The
algorithm of finding k nearest neighbors is presented in Section 4 with detailed formal
analysis on its complexity and performance tradeoffs. Finally, we discuss some related
approaches in Section 6.

2

2

Random Space Encryption

In this section, we propose the basic RAndom SPace Encryption(RASP) approach for encrypted outsourced databases. First we give the system framework and assumptions held
for different threat models. Second, we define and present what the RASP encryption is.
Finally, we give an analysis about how our encryption model can be resilient from data
attacks.

2.1 System Architecture and Threat Model
System Architecture. Figure 1 shows how our model works to provide query services. The
data owner encrypts the original data in its inhouse proxy server with the RASP encryption
and uploads them to the service provider. The proxy server is the gateway for query processing. It encrypts queries, submits them to the service provider, and decrypts the query
results returned from the service provider. The proxy server maintains the security keys,
which are used in outsourcing data and encrypting queries. The traffic between the proxy
server and the service provider contains only the encrypted data and queries. Although
the proxy server does not handle the large dataset and process queries, it might still be a
bottleneck for a large number of users and frequent query submissions. However, the cost
to scale the proxy server should be much lower than that to host the entire query processing service and we will compare the time cost between the proxy server and the service
provider.
Threat Model. We aim to protect the confidentiality of the outsourced data and the privacy
of query. While query integrity is also an important issue, it is orthogonal to our study.
Authentication techniques [23, 21, 13] can be integrated into our framework to address the
integrity problem. Thus, the integrity problem will be excluded from the paper. We can
assume the curious service provider is interested in the data and queries, but it will follow
the protocol to provide the service. Also, we assume that the attacker knows the algorithms
to encrypt data and queries. Active attackers will also try to obtain as much prior knowledge
3
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Figure 1: The kNN-R System Architecture.
as possible to break the encryption. According to the level of prior knowledge the attacker
may have, we categorize the attacks into three categories.
• Level 1: The attacker observes only the encrypted database and encrypted queries.
She/he is interested in the distributions (e.g., dimensional distributions) of the original database and the original data records. This corresponds to ciphertext-only attack(COA) in cryptography [12].
• Level 2: Apart from the encrypted database, the attacker knows the original data
distributions and wants to recover the original records.
• Level 3: In addition to the above knowledge, the attacker manages to obtain a number
of plaintext records/ queries and their ciphertext images. This corresponds to the
chosen plaintext attack (CPA) in the cryptography.
The three levels also correspond to the difficulty level of obtaining the required prior knowledge. We will analyze the security of our approach based on the three levels of attacker
models.

4

2.2 Definitions and Notations
Let Rd represent the d dimensional real domain. We define a d-dimensional point xi , xi ∈
Rd , as a column vector (xi1 , xi2 , . . . , xid )T , xij ∈ R. The j-th dimensional value xij is
treated as a sample value from the distribution of random variable Xj , which distributes
over a continuous real domain Dj with domain length |Dj |. A database M is a set of ddimensional points {x1 , x2 , . . . , xn }, where n is the number of points.
For convenience, we use closed ranges in the following description. A d dimensional closed
range S consists of the dimensional range [si,min , si,max ] for the i-th dimension, where
si,min and si,max define the lower and upper bounds, respectively. The length of dimension
i of the range S is defined as si,max − si,min . A range query is defined as a query that returns
the records enclosed by the range S. A kNN query is a point-based query that returns k
nearest neighbors of the query point.

2.3 RASP Data Encryption
Random Space Encryption(RASP) is one type of multiplicative perturbation [5]. Let xi
be a plaintext record and yi be a ciphertext record. xi has d dimensions and yi has (d+2)
dimensions. The RASP involves two steps.
1. the vector of xi is first extended to d + 2 dimensions as (xi T , 1, v)T , where the (d +
1)-th dimension is always a 1 and v is drawn from (0, α] using a random number
generator Rα , with some private α and distribution.
2. After this extension the (d + 2)-dimensional vector is then subjected to the transfor

mation



 xi 


,
yi = A 
1




v

(1)

where A is a (k + 2) × (k + 2) randomly generated invertible matrix with aij ∈ R
5

such that there are at least two non-zero values in each row of A and the last column
of A is also non-zero.
The proxy server keeps only the key matrix A for data and query encryption. Since the
noise component vi is not kept, the encrypted data yi incorporates the random noise vi
that is not traceable, which increases the security. Note the d dimensions attending the
RASP encryption are only those dimensions in the database meaningful for query service.
A database may contain more dimensions, which can be in other types, e.g. texts, or images.
In practice, we use a conventional encryption to encrypt/decrypt the entire record, while
only using RASP to encrypt the d dimensions for indexing and querying.
RASP has two important features. First, RASP does not preserve the ordering of dimensional values, which distinguishes itself from order preserving encryption schemes, and thus
does not suffer from attacks with prior knowledge. Second, RASP is convexity preserving,
so a convex set S such as range query can be transformed into another encrypted convex set
S’ in the encrypted databases. Any point in S cannot be mapped to a point outside S’ and
any point not in S cannot be mapped to a point in S’.
RASP is Not Order Preserving. Let x be any record in the dataset, and f i be the selection
vector (0, . . . , 1, . . . , 0) i.e., only the i-th dimension is 1 and other dimensions are 0. Then,
(f i )x will return the value at dimension i of x.
Proposition 1. Suppose A is the key matrix for RASP encryption, s and t are both extended original data points with random noises. s′ and t′ are the encrypted data points.
si , ti , s′i andt′i are the values at the i-th dimension of each corresponding vector. Then
(si − ti )(s′i − t′i ) could be either positive or negative.
Proof: we have s′i = (f i )As and t′i = (f i )At. Thus, we get

(si − ti )(s′i − t′i ) = (si − ti )(f i )T A(s − t)
k
∑
= (si − ti )
ai,j (sj − tj ),
j=1

6

(2)

where ai,j is the i-th row j-th column element of A. Without loss of generality, let’s assume
si > ti (for si < ti the same proof applies). It is straightforward to see that given the fixed
∑
values of A, the values of sj and tj for all j ̸= i can be chosen so that (si −ti ) kj=1 ai,j (sj −
tj ) is either negative or positive. Note that since each row of A has at least two non-zero
entries, even if ai,i (si − ti )2 > 0 (or < 0), using the other non-zero value in the i-th row
∑
of A, say ai,k , the sign of (si − ti ) kj=1 ai,j (sj − tj ) can be adjusted to either positive or
negative by appropriately choosing the values sk and tk .
RASP is Convexity Preserving. Let’s treat data records as points in a real multidimensional space. In the following, we will show that although RASP does not preserve ordering, it
preserves convexity, which forms the basis of our query processing strategy. The following
definitions of convex set and convexity preserving function can be found in most textbooks
on convex optimization, e.g., [3].
Definition 1. A set S is a convex set, if and only if for ∀x1 , x2 ∈ S, and ∀θ ∈ [0, 1],

θx1 + (1 − θ)x2 ∈ S

Definition 2. A convexity preserving function E() preserves the convexity of sets. Concretely, if S is a convex set in the original data space, the function E() always transforms S to
another convex set E(S).
The following proposition cited from [3] is critical to the proof of convexity preserving
property of RASP encryption and our query processing algorithm.
Proposition 2. (1) Every convex set is a (possibly infinite) intersection of halfspaces, i.e.,
∩

Hi , where Hi defines a halfspace; and (2) the intersection of (possibly infinite) convex

sets is also convex.
With this proposition we can prove that
7

Proposition 3. RASP encryption is convexity preserving.
Beweis. We assume an original convex set in Rk (that is closed) is the intersection of a set
of halfspaces

∩

Hi , where a halfspace Hi can be represented as wiT x ≤ ai (“=” for the

closed set), and wi ∈ Rk and ai ∈ R are parameters for the halfspace. By replacing x with
a column vector z = (xT , 1, v)T and wi with ui = (wiT , −ai , 0)T , the set enclosed by Hi is
transformed to the set enclosed by the halfspace Hiext : uTi z ≤ 0. With the RASP function,
we have y = Az, and thus this halfspace Hiext can be further transformed to Hi′ as follows

uTi A−1 y ≤ 0.

(3)

Each of the halfspace conditions, Hi′ , in the transformed space represents a convex set.
Thus, the intersection of them is convex as well. Therefore, the RASP encryption is convexity preserving.
Since a range query defines a convex set, the transformation method (Eq. 3) gives a basic
method for transforming the range query for the RASP encrypted data - we name it RASP
query transformation method. The following proposition shows that by searching with the
transformed conditions in the encrypted data space, we can get the exact set of points that
is the image of the query result in the original data space.
Proposition 4. Let Hi and Hi′ be halfspaces defined as in the proof of Proposition 3. The
RASP query transformation uniquely maps the convex set S enclosed by halfspaces
to the convex set S ′ enclosed by

∩

∩

Hi

Hi′ .

Based on this proposition, It is straightforward to show that by using the RASP query
transformation, any point in S cannot be mapped to a point outside S ′ and any point not in
S cannot be mapped to a point in S ′ , which is an important character for query services.
8

2.4 Analysis of Attacks on RASP-Perturbed Data
As the threat model describes, attackers are interested in recovering the original data records from the perturbed data. According to the three levels of knowledge the attacker may
have, we categorize the attacks on the perturbed data into three classes: (1) Naive estimation; (2) Distribution-based Attacks; and (3) Known Input/Output Attacks. Because of the
random component in the RASP encryption, the best the attacker can do is to estimate the
original records based on the perturbed data and the prior knowledge. If the estimation result is sufficiently accurate (above certain accuracy threshold), we say the perturbation is
not secure. We will define the attacks and then analyze their effectiveness. The attacks on
the queries will be discussed later in query processing.
Measuring Effectiveness of Attack Because all attacks under the threat model are estimation attacks, we use the commonly used mean-squared-error (MSE) to evaluate the effectiveness of attack. To be semantically consistent, each dimension can be treated as sample
values drawn from a random variable. Let xij be the value of the i-th original record in j-th
dimension and x̂ij be the estimated value. The MSE for the j-th dimension can be defined
as

1∑
M SE(Xj , X̂j ) =
(xij − x̂ij )2 .
n i=1
n

It is equivalent to the variance of xij − x̂ij . For comparing MSE for multiple columns,
we also standardize these two series {xij } and {x̂ij }, before calculating the MSE. The
standardization procedure [8] is described as follows. Assume the mean and variance of the
series {xij } is µj and σj2 , correspondingly. The series is transformed by xij ← (xij −µj )/σj .
A similar procedure is also applied to the series {x̂ij }. For an attack that can only result in
low-accuracy estimation, we call the RASP-perturbed dataset is resilient to that attack.
Naive Estimation. With the level 1 knowledge, the attacker observes only the perturbed
data. Because none of the important relationships such as value order, distance, or statistics,
is preserved, we have not discovered attacks that can obtain meaningful estimation of the
original data, and believe this type of attacks is not realistic.
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Distribution-based Attack. With the level 2 knowledge, the attacker also knows dimensional distributions. This knowledge can be possibly used to perform more effective attacks.
In particular, when the original data have independent dimensions and no more than one
dimension having normal distribution, an attack called Independent Component Analysis
(ICA) [11] can be applied to estimate the original data from the perturbed data. Originally
developed for signal processing, ICA is used to discover components A (the mixing matrix)
and X (the original signals) from the mixed data Y = AX. Since ICA recovers columns
in an arbitrary order, it has to rely on the known distributional information to distinguish
the columns and order them correctly. Furthermore, the effectiveness of ICA heavily depends on the independence of the columns and the number of columns having non-normal
distributions. In most real datasets, these two conditions, independent columns and only
one column in normal distribution, are normally unsatisfied, which significantly reduces
the effectiveness of ICA, as we show in experiments.
Correspondingly, in the RASP perturbation, we use the following methods to further enhance the resilience to the ICA-based attack: (1) generating the noise component with the
normal distribution, (2) using the OPE scheme to convert the column distributions to normal distributions. According to the property of OPE that can change the dimensional value
distribution arbitrarily while keeping the value orders unchanged [1], we can choose Eope
to output values in normal distributions. As ICA fails to distinguish dimensions with normal distributions, this will effectively protect the original data. This enhancement can be
optional. The noise v is drawn from a normal distribution that is designed as follows. The
idea is the normal distribution should have the majority population positive. Specifically,
we can choose a normal distribution with the mean µ, µ > 0, and the standard deviation
µ/6. It is easy to prove that over 99% values drawn from the distribution are positive. With
these enhancements, the RASP-perturbed data are resilient to ICA-based attacks.
Known Input/Output Attack. With the level 3 knowledge, the attacker knows a number
of input/output record pairs. Concretely, let Pd×m be the known m d-dimensional original
records (y1 , . . . , ym ), and Qd+2×m be the corresponding perturbed m d + 2-dimensional
10

records (x1 , . . . , xm ). The known input/output attack can be treated as a general regression
problem, where the training dataset consists of the tuples (xi , yij ), i = 1 . . . m for the j-th
dimension. The attacker tries to learn a model between the feature vectors {xi , xi ∈ Rd+2 }
and the responses {yij , yij ∈ R} [8]. In this way, we can build a model for each dimension
j.
To understand the effectiveness of the regression-based attack, we analyze a simplified
case, where the transformation Eope is not applied: F (x) = A(xT , 1, v)T . This analysis
will give a lower-bound accuracy that the known input/output attack can achieve, because
the inclusion of Eope will not make the attack easier.
Let A decomposed into blocks A = (A1 , A2 , A3 ), where A1 , A2 and A3 have block
 sizes

 P 



(d + 2) × d, (d + 2) × 1 and (d + 2) × 1, respectively, and the extended data be 
I




V
where I is the row vector with ‘1’ and V is a row vector with random positive values,
corresponding to the two additional dimensions in RASP. Thus, the relationship between
P and Q can be represented as




 P 


 = A1 P + A2 I + A3 V,
Q = (A1 , A2 , A3 ) 
I




V

(4)

where A2 I is a translation matrix that adds the vector A2 to each of the column vectors
in A1 P , and A3 V is a random noise matrix. With sufficient number of known record
pairs (m > d + 2), the translation component can be canceled out; then, the regression
method can be applied to estimate A1 . With the estimate Â1 of A1 , A2 can be estimated as well. Therefore, for a perturbed dataset Y , the estimate of the original data X is
X̂ = (ÂT1 Â1 )−1 ÂT1 (Y − Â2 I), according to the regression theory.
Now we analyze the error of this estimation, which gives a lower bound of the MSE for the
general cases. Let H = (AT1 A1 )−1 AT1 and Ĥ be the version with Â1 . Let Hj represent the
11

j-th row of H. According to the definition of RASP, each dimension Xj is generated by
Xj = Hj (Y − A2 I − A3 V ). With the estimate Â1 and Â2 , X̂j = Ĥj (Y − Â2 I). Then, we
have
X̂j − Xj = (Ĥj − Hj )Y + (Hj A2 I − Ĥj Â2 I) + Hj A3 V.

(5)

2
M SE(Xj , X̂j ) = var(X̂j − Xj ) > var(Hj A3 V ) = (Hj A3 )2 σRG
,

(6)

It follows that

2
where Hj A3 is a constant determined by the matrix A, and σRG
is the variance of the noise.

Therefore, as long as we make sure the matrix A and the noise generator are appropriately
2
selected so that the values Hj A3 and σRG
are sufficiently large, the perturbed dataset is

resilient to the known input/output attack. One of the RASP’s unique advantages is that the
increase of noise variance does not affect the utility of the perturbed data. We will show
this property in query processing.

3

Range Query Processing with RASP

Based on the RASP encryption we proposed, we target to provide two kinds of query services: range query and k nearest neighbors. Since RASP encryption is convexity preserving
and a range query can represented as a convex set query, in the encrypted space there is a unique convex set that is the answer to the query. To efficiently process range query, we could
use multidimensional index trees, such as R-Tree [16] that handles axis-aligned minimum
bounding boxes (MBR). However, if we still depend on the multidimensional indexing to
process the transformed queries, the processing algorithm should be slightly modified to
handle arbitrary convex areas because the boundaries of transformed queries are in arbitrary convex shape, not necessarily axis-aligned as Figure 2 shows. So we use a two-stage
query processing strategy to process the encrypted query. In the first stage, the proxy trans-
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forms the original range space to a polyhedron and finds the MBR of polyhedron using
vertex-based algorithm. To submit a range query for the MBR of this polyhedron, we could
get the initial result set. In the second stage, we could linear scan the data in the initial
result set and filter out the data which are not in the polyhedron. In the following sections,
we will introduce a simple query transformation first and then convert it into one against
query-based attacks.

3.1 Query Transformation
In this section, we discuss how to transform an original range query into the encrypted one
in details. First, let’s look at the general form of a range query condition. Let Xi be an
attribute in the database. A simple condition in a range query involves only one attribute
and is of the form “Xi <op> ai ”, where ai is a constant in the normalized domain of
Xi and op ∈ {<, >, =, ≤, ≥, ̸=} is a comparison operator. For convenience we will only
discuss how to process Xi ≤ ai , while the proposed method can be slightly changed for
other conditions. Any complicated range query can be transformed into the disjunction of a
∪
∩
set of conjunctions, i.e., nj=1 ( m
i=1 Ci,j ), where m, n are some integers depending on the
original query conditions and Ci,j is a simple condition about Xi . Again, to simplify the
presentation we restrict our discussion to single conjunction condition ∩m
i=1 Ci . A simple
condition Xi ≤ ai is a halfspace condition. Following the previous discussion, Xi ≤ ai
is converted to the extended vector representation first: uT z ≤ 0, where u is a d + 2
dimensional vector with ui = 1, uk+1 = −ai , and uj = 0 for j ̸= i, d + 1, (for Xi ≥ ai ,
ui = −1, ud+1 = ai ), and z = (xT , 1, v)T . Then, let y be the auxiliary vector, i.e., y = Az.
The original condition is transformed to the form of Eq. 3 in the encrypted space.
As Proposition 4 shows, searching with the transformed queries on the auxiliary vectors is
equivalent to searching with the original queries and data. Someone may notice that this
simple query transformation is vulnerable to query-based attacks if the attacker is able to
know original query and the transformed query at the same time. In next section we discuss
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Stage1:
Bounding
box

Original space

Transformed space

Figure 2: Illustration of the two-stage range query processing algorithm.
how to construct a secure query transformation.

3.2 Secure Query Transformation Countering Query-based Attacks
To counter against query-based attacks, we have to construct secure query conditions. The
additional dimension xd+2 is used to construct secure query condition with the simple query
transformation. Using the extended vector form zT = (xT , 1, v), we have Xi − ai = zT u
and Xd+2 = wT z, where ui = 1, ud+1 = −ai , uj = 0, for j ̸= i, d + 1; wd+2 = 1 and
wj = 0, for j ̸= d + 2. With the transformation y = Az, we get the transformed quadratic
query condition
yT (A−1 )T uwT A−1 y ≤ 0.

(7)

Let Θ = (A−1 )T uwT A−1 . In the two-stage processing strategy, the bounding box of the
transformed query area is calculated in the proxy server as we discussed earlier. Then, this
bounding box and the parameters Θi for each condition i, are submitted to the server. Thus,
assume each dimension is represented with two half space conditions, the encrypted query
EQ is represented as {MBR,{Θ1 , . . . , Θ2d }}. The server will use the bounding box to get
the first-stage results and then use the conditions, e.g., yT Θi y ≤ 0, to filter out the results.
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4

KNN-R: Using Range Queries to Process kNN Queries

As we have mentioned, the quality of secure outsourced kNN query service can be summarized as the CPEL criteria: data Confidentiality, query Privacy, Efficient query processing,
and Low inhouse workload. The proposed kNN-R approach aims to achieve a balanced
overall CPEL criteria. In the following discussion, we use the “client” to represent the data
owner’s inhouse proxy server.
The confidentiality of data and the query privacy are guaranteed by using the RASP encryption. We will discuss the security issues in next section. The server-side efficiency is
achieved by the index-aided query processing and an efficient secure binary range query
algorithm. Low client-side cost is achieved by fast query preprocessing and high precision
query results. In this section, first, we will give the overview of the kNN-R algorithm and
then discuss the server-side and client-side components of the query processing algorithm.

4.1 Overview of the kNN-R Algorithm
The kNN-R algorithm aims to improve the confidentiality guarantee while preserving the
efficiency of query processing. The basic idea is to use the RASP encryption to protect the
confidentiality of data, and to use secure range query to protect the privacy of kNN query.
The key is to develop an efficient kNN query algorithm based on the RASP encrypted data
and queries.
The design of kNN-R algorithm keeps the following problems in mind. (1) While the RASP
protects the data confidentiality, it does not preserve distances or distance ranks. Therefore,
the traditional distance-based kNN search algorithm does not work with the RASP encrypted data. Can we design a kNN search algorithm based on existing RASP range query
algorithm? (2)Because of the limited computing capacity of the client side (the proxy server in Figure 1), the new algorithm should minimize the client’s responsibility in query
processing, which includes pre-processing, post-processing, and in-processing aid. Thus,
the second question is how we design the algorithms to minimize the client’s costs.
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Figure 3: Procedure of KNN-R algorithm
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We briefly describe the kNN-R algorithm as follows. In the kNN-R algorithm the client
and the server collaboratively finish the kNN query processing. This algorithm is based
on square ranges to approximately find the kNN candidates for a query point. We define
square range as follows.
Definition 3. A square range is a hyper cube that is centered at the query point and has
equal-length edges.
The basic idea is to find the square range that contains at least k points and then expands
it to surely include the kNN candidates. Figure 4 illustrates the range-query-based kNN
processing with two-dimensional data. The Inner Range is the square range that contains
at least k points, and the Outer Range is the square range extended from the inner range.
The outer range surely contains the kNN results (Proposition 5) but it may also contain
irrelevant points that need to be filtered out.
Concretely, the kNN-R algorithm consists of five steps involving both the client and the
server. Figure 3 demonstrates the whole procedure of the algorithm and the Algorithm 1
explains the algorithm step by step. The client will generate the initial upper bound range
(that contains more than k points) and the lower bound range (that contains less than k
points) and send them to the server. The server finds the inner range and returns to the
client. The client calculates the outer range based on the inner range and sends it back to
the server. The server finds the records in the outer range and sends them to the client. The
client decrypts the records and pick the top k candidates as the final result.
Algorithm 1 KNN-R algorithm
1: The client generates the initial range and sends its secure form to the server;
2: The server works on the secure range queries and finds the inner range covering at least
k points;
3: The client decodes the secure inner range from the server and extends it to the outer
range, which is sent back to the server;
4: The server returns the points in the outer range
5: The client decrypts the points and extracts the k nearest points;

It is very easy to verify that the following conclusion.
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Proposition 5. The kNN-R algorithm returns results with 100% recall.
Sketch of Proof: The sphere in Figure 4 between the outer range and the inner range covers
all points with distances less than the radius r. Because the inner range contains at least k
points, there are at least k nearest neighbors to the query points with distances less than the
radius r. Therefore, the k nearest neighbors must be in the outer range.
If the points are approximately uniformly distributed, we can estimate the precision of the
server returned results. With the assumption of uniformly distributed points, the number of
points contained by the inner range and the outer range is proportion to their areas. Based
on the relationship between them, it is easy to derive that the area of outer range is two
times of the inner range. Thus, if the inner range contains m points, m >= k, the number
of points contained by the outer range is around 2m points. The precision is

k
.
2m

Therefore,

we know the precision for uniformly distributed data is around 0.5.
There are three challenges in this process. (1) Because the inner range will determine the
precision of the result, we want to find inner ranges as compact as possible. (2) As the
server works on encrypted range queries only, it is challenging to find the inner range
based on encrypted range queries. Is it possible that the server works on the initial ranges
solely to derive a compact inner range without additional interactions with the client? (3)
The setting of initial range may also affect the efficiency of server-side processing. Can the
client quickly decide a valid initial range?

4.2 Definitions of Compact Inner Square Range
An important step in the kNN-R algorithm is to find the compact inner square range to
achieve high precision. However, finding compact inner range may involve a complicated
tradeoff between the precision and the cost of query processing, which in turn implies
a tradeoff between the client’s load and the server’s load. To study this tradeoff, in the
following, we give two definitions of compact inner square range: the k minimum range
and the (k, δ)-range. Both definitions will guarantee 100% recall.
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Let S−ϵ represent that each side of a square range S shrinks by ϵ distance to the center. We
have the following definition.
Definition 4. A square range, S, centered at the query point is the k minimum range if and
only if S covers at least k points, but for any small number ϵ, S−ϵ covers less than k points.
The k minimum range defines the smallest inner square range that satisfies the requirement
of Algorithm 1 to ensure 100% recall. Because of the precise definition, there is a substantial cost to achieve the k minimum range. On the other hand, if we consider the balance
between the cost and the precision, we may need a more flexible definition. We give a
relaxed definition (k, δ)-range as follows.
Definition 5. A (k, δ)-range is any square range centered at the query point, the number of
points in which is in the range [k, k + δ], δ is a nonnegative integer.
We will study the algorithms to efficiently find these ranges and investigate the relationship
and tradeoffs between the precision and the efficiency of query processing.

4.3 Algorithms for Finding Inner Square Range
With the precise definitions of the k minimum range and the (k, δ)-range, we design algorithms to find them, respectively. The basic algorithms are based on binary range search.

K Minimum Range Algorithm
Suppose a search space centered at the query point with length of L in each dimension is
represented as S (L) . Let the number of points included by this range is N (L) . If a square
range S (in) is enclosed by another square range S (out) , we say S (in) ⊂ S (out) . It directly
follows that N (in) ≤ N (out) . It is also easy to derive that
Corollary 1. If N (in) < N (out) , S (in) ⊂ S (out) .
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Using this definition, we can always construct a series of enclosed square ranges centered
on the query point: S (L1 ) ⊂ S (L2 ) ⊂ . . . , ⊂ S (Lm ) . Correspondingly, the numbers of points
enclosed by {S (Li ) } have the ordering N (L1 ) ≤ N (L2 ) ≤ . . . N (Lm ) . Assume S (L1 ) is the
range containing only the query point, and S (Lm ) is the initial upper bound range returned
by the client. The problem of finding the k minimum range S can be mapped to the binary
search over the sequence {S (Li ) }.
In each step of the binary search, we start with a lower bound range, denoted as S (low) and
a higher bound range, S (high) . We want the corresponding numbers of enclosed points to
satisfy N (low) < k ≤ N (high) in each step, which is achieved with the following procedure.
First, we find the middle square range S (mid) , where and mid = (low + high)/2. If S (mid)
covers no less than k points, the higher bound: S (high) is updated to S (mid) ; otherwise, the
lower bound: S (low) is updated to S (mid) . At the beginning step S (low) is set to S (L1 ) and
S (high) is S (Lm ) . Afterwards this binary search process repeats until high − low < E, where
E is a predefined small value. Algorithm 2 describes these steps.
Algorithm 2 K Minimum Range Algorithm
1: procedure K-M INIMUM -R ANGE (L1 , Lm , k)
2:
high ← Lm , low ← L1 ;
3:
while high − low ≥ E do
4:
mid ← (high + low)/2;
5:
num ← number of points in S (mid) ;
6:
if num ≥ k then
7:
high ← mid;
8:
else
9:
low ← mid;
10:
end if
11:
end while
12:
return S (high) ;
13: end procedure

Let’s define the distance between S (Li ) and S (Lj ) as
D(S (Li ) , S (Lj ) ) = |Li − Lj |. Each step of the loop results in a reduced distance αi , of
which α0 = |Lm − L1 |, and αi = αi−1 /2. When αi < E, the algorithm stops. We have the
following proposition.
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Proposition 6. The output of Algorithm 2 is a square range within E distance to the k
minimum range.
Sketch of Proof: Note that the statements 6-10 in Algorithm 2 guarantee N (low) < k ≤
N (high) in each update. With Corollary 1 and the definition of k minimum range, we have
S (low) ⊂ S ⊂ S (high) . It follows that D(S (high) , S) < D(S (high) , S (low) ). Once the distance
αi < E, we have D(S (high) , S) < D(S (high) , S (low) ) = αi < E.
Complexity. The algorithm results in a series of distances, αi , between the higher and
the lower bounds. The initial distance α0 = |Lm − L1 | and sequentially αi = αi−1 /2.
When αi < E, the algorithm stops. Let the total number of iterations be r. It follows
αr = α0 /2r < E. Therefore, the number of iteration is

r = ⌈log

α0
⌉.
E

(8)

It is related to the selections of S (Lm ) and S L1 , and also the setting of E.

(k, δ)-Range Algorithm
According to Equation 8, by tuning E we can possibly make a tradeoff between the precision and the performance. Alternatively, we can find the (k, δ)-range where δ is tunable.
We slightly change Algorithm 2 to derive an algorithm for finding (k, δ)-range. Because
(k, δ)-range is any square range of which the number of points is between k and k + δ,
as long as we encounter such a square range in the binary search, the algorithm can stop.
Algorithm 3 gives the details.
There is an intricate relationship between the k minimum range algorithm and the (k, δ)range algorithm. Assume the point distribution is uniform. Let the length of the k minimum
range be a, and that of the square range containing k + δ points be b. It is easy to obtain that
√
√
k+δ
b ≈ k+δ
a.
Therefore,
when
we
set
E
=
(b
−
a)/2
≈
1/2(
− 1)a, the k minimum
k
k
range algorithm returns approximately the same result as the (k, δ)-range algorithm does.
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Algorithm 3 (K, δ)-Range Algorithm
1: procedure (K, δ)-R ANGE(L1 , Lm , k, δ)
2:
high ← Lm , low ← L1 ;
3:
while high − low ≥ E do
4:
mid ← (high + low)/2;
5:
num ← number of points in S (mid) ;
6:
if num ≥ k&&num 6 k + δ then
7:
Break the loop;
8:
else if num > k + delta then
9:
high ← mid;
10:
else
11:
low ← mid;
12:
end if
13:
end while
14:
return S (mid) ;
15: end procedure
However, since the distribution is often non-uniform, the (k, δ)-range algorithm is more
flexible and efficient than k minimum algorithm. We will compare them in experiments.

4.4 Finding Inner Range with Secure Range Queries
Algorithm 2 and 3 give the basic ideas of finding the inner range. There are two critical
operations in these algorithms: (1) finding the number of points in a square range and (2)
updating the higher and lower bounds. Under the secure range query framework, the first
operation can be securely conducted by the server. However, it is challenging to efficiently
implement the second operation. In this section, we first describe a straightforward solution,
which, however, needs multiple rounds of interactions between the client and the server,
thus too expensive to be practical. Then, we give an algorithm that allows the server to
work on the secure higher and lower bound range queries to derive the secure middle range
query without the client’s help, which significantly improves the efficiency of server-side
query processing.
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Client-Server Interaction Method
Because the server does not know the plain value of high and low, the calculation: mid =
(high + low)/2 and the update to the higher or lower bound have to be done in the client.
Concretely, if we look at the k minimum range algorithm, Algorithm 2, the client has to
execute all steps except step 5, which is done by submitting a range query for S (mid) to
the server to find the number of enclosed points. As we have mentioned in Section 4.3, the
number of interactions will be O(log αE0 ) for the k minimum range algorithm, which could
be expensive. The (k, δ)-range algorithm needs less number of interactions, but it would
be better to eliminate all the interactions. The following algorithm describes a server-only
solution.

Server Only Method
The client-server interaction method requires a significant amount of communication cost.
It is better to eliminate or reduce this cost. In the following, we show that it is possible to
compute the encrypted middle range based on encrypted higher and lower ranges, if they
are encrypted with the RASP encryption.
As discussed in the RASP query processing [4], a range query S (L) is securely encoded
as the MBR(L) of its polyhedron range in the encrypted space and the 2(d + 2) dimensio(L)

nal conditions1 y T Θi y ≤ 0 determining the sides of the polyhedron, each of the d + 2
extended dimensions gets a pair of conditions for the upper and lower bounds, respectively.
The problem of binary search is to use the higher bound range S (high) and the lower bound
range S (low) to derive S (mid) . When all of these ranges are encrypted, the problem is trans(mid)

formed to (1) deriving Θi

(high)

from Θi

(low)

and Θi

; and (1) deriving MBR(mid) from

MBR(high) and MBR(low) .
(mid)

Finding Θi

. Without loss of generality, we consider only the upper bound condition for

dimension i - the lower bound can be handled similarly. Let Xi ≤ si,max be the upper bound
1

For the extended d+2 dimensions, including the ‘1’ dimension and the noise dimension.
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(high)

(low)

(mid)

condition. Correspondingly, si,max , si,max , and si,max are the upper bounds for the ranges
(mid)

S (high) , S (low) , and S (mid) . According to the algorithm, there is a relationship si,max =
(high)

(low)

(si,max + si,max )/2.
In RASP, the condition Xi ≤ si,max is equivalent to (Xi − si,max )Xk+2 ≤ 0 because of
Xk+2 > 0. (Xi − ai )Xk+2 ≤ 0 is further transformed to the encrypted form

yT (A−1 )T uwT A−1 y ≤ 0.

(9)

where for the vector u, ui = 1, uk+1 = −si,max , uj = 0, for j ̸= i, k + 1; for the vector
w, wk+2 = 1 and wj = 0, for j ̸= k + 2. We use Θi to denote the parameter matrix
(A−1 )T uwT A−1 .
Let’s represent A−1 with block matrices: A−1

 
A1 
=  , A1 is the first d rows of A−1 ,
A2

a d × (d + 2) matrix, and A2 is the last two rows of A−1 , a 2 × (d + 2) matrix. wT is
[
[
]
]
T
represented as w = 0 I2 , where 0 is a zero vector of length d and I2 = 0 −1 .
 
I1 
Let the vector u be u =  , where I1 is a d × 1 vector with all elements zero except
B


−si,max 
its i-th element is 1 and B = 
. With all these block matrix representation, Θi =
0
 
 
[
]
[
]
A1 
I1 
T
T  
A1 A2
0 I2  
B
A2
][
]
[
= AT1 I1 + AT2 B I2 A2 = AT1 I1 I2 A2 + AT2 BI2 A2 . Note that AT1 I1 I2 A2 is a constant
matrix, independent of the condition. We denote the constant part with P1 = AT1 I1 I2 A2 .
Let P2 be the remaining
part P2 = AT2 BI
2 A2 ,

a1,1 a1,2 · · ·
Let A2 be A2 = 
a2,1 a2,2 · · ·

a1,d+2 

a2,d+2
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We have

P2



]
[
−si,max 
T 
= A2 
 0 −1 A2
0


a1,1
a2,1





 a1,2

a2,2  0 −si,max  a1,1

=  .


.. 
 .

.
.
0
0
a2,1




a1,d+2 a2,d+2


a2,1 
 a1,1



 a1,2

a2,2  a2,1 a2,2

= −si,max  .

.. 
 ..
0
. 

 0


a1,d+2 a2,d+2


···
···

a1,d+2 

a2,d+2


···

a2,d+2 

0

···

Thus, we can represent P2 with −si,max P3 , where P3 is the constant part in the above
equation. It follows that Θi = P1 − si,max P3 , and we can derive

(high)

(Θi

(mid)

It shows that Θi

(low)

+ Θi

(high)

(low)

(mid)

)/2 = P1 − (si,max + si,max )/2 ∗ P3 = Θi

(high)

can be directly computed with Θi

.

(low)

and Θi

Finding M BR(mid) . In general, the MBR of an arbitrary polyhedron can be derived based
on the vertices of the polyhedron. Based on the property of convexity preserving of RASP
[4], a polyhedron is mapped to another polyhedron in the encrypted space. Concretely,
let a polyhedron P has m vertices {x1 , . . . , xm }, which are mapped to the vertices in the
encrypted space: {y1 , . . . , ym }. Then, the upper bound and lower bound of dimension j
of the M BR of the polyhedron in the encrypted space are determined by max{yij , i =
1 . . . m} and min{yij , i = 1 . . . m}, respectively.
Since we only use MBR to reduce the set of results for filtering, a slightly larger MBR
would still guarantee the correctness of the MBR based query processing algorithm, with

25

possibly increased filtering cost. In the following, we try to find such a MBR to enclose
MBR(mid) . By the definition of the square ranges S (low) , S (mid) and S (high) , their vertices
(mid)

have the relationship xi
(low)

as yi

(high)

, yi

(mid)

, and yi

(low)

= (xi

(low)

(high)

+ yi

)/2. The images of the vertices are notated

, respectively. Correspondingly, the MBR(mid) in the encrypted
(mid)

, . . . , ym

(mid)

, 1, (vi

space should be found from {y1
ce (yi

(high)

+ xi

)/2 = A(xi

(mid)

(low)

(mid)

}, where yi
(high)

+ vi

(mid)

, 1, vi

(low)

+ vi

= A(xi

)/2)T , and (vi

(mid) T

) . Sin-

(high)

)/2 is a
(low)

valid positive random number. Thus, MBR(mid) can be determined with vertices {(yi
(high)

yi

+

)/2}.

Let the j-th dimension of MBR(L) represented as
(L)

(L)

(L)

(L)

(L)

(high)

[sj,min , sj,max ], where sj,min = min{yij , i = 1 . . . m}, and sj,max = max{yij

,i =

(low)

1 . . . m}. Now we choose the MBR(M ID) as follows: for j-th dimension we use [(sj,min +
(high)

(low)

(high)

sj,min )/2, (sj,max + sj,max )/2]. We show that
Proposition 7. MBR(M ID) encloses MBR(mid) .
Proof. For two sets of m real values {a1 , . . . , am } and {b1 , . . . , bm }, it is easy to verify that

max{a1 , . . . , am } + max{b1 , . . . , bm } ≥ max{a1 + b1 , . . . , a1 + bm }

min{a1 , . . . , am } + min{b1 , . . . , bm } ≤ min{a1 + b1 , . . . , a1 + bm }.
(low)

(high)

(low)

Thus, (si,min + si,min )/2 ≤ min{(yij
(high)

(high)

+ yij

(mid)

(low)

)/2, i = 1 . . . m} = si,min , and (si,max +

(mid)

si,max )/2 ≥ si,max . Since for each dimension, MBR(M ID) encloses MBR(mid) , we have
MBR(M ID) encloses M BR(mid) .
(mid)

Since MBR(M ID) can be calculated based on MBR(high) and MBR(low) , and Θi
(high)

(Θi

(low)

+ Θi

=

)/2, the server can process the k minimum range or (k, δ)-range algo-

rithm without the help of the client.
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4.5 Finding Compact Initial Range with Density Map
The complexity of both the k minimum range algorithm and the (k, δ)-range algorithm is
determined by the initial higher bound range provided by the client. Thus, it is important to
provide a compact initial range to help the server processes queries more efficiently. A naive
method for determining the initial range is to provide the entire domain space. Assume each
dimension is bounded, i.e., the dimension i has a bounded domain [si,min , si,max ]. Let the
query point Q be Q = (q1 , q2 , . . . , qd ). The problem is to find a sphere centered on the query
point Q that covers the entire domain. For the i-th dimension, if we draw a circle centered
on qi to cover the whole dimensional domain, the radius ri is max{qi − si,min , si,max − qi }.
For all d dimension, if we draw a sphere to cover the entire d dimensional domain, then the
radius r = max{r1 , r2 , · · · , rd }. Therefore, the initial higher bound range is [qi − r, qi + r]
for dimension i.
We use the density-map method to help the proxy find the compact initial range. A density
map is a multidimensional equi-width histogram. We partition each dimension equivalently into C shares to generate a C d -cell grid structure. A d-dimensional point is uniquely
mapped to one of the cells. Each cell records the number of points mapped to it. We define
Definition 6. The distance between a cell and the query point is the distance from the query
point to the furthest corner of the cell.
Algorithm 4 shows an example in two dimensional space. It aims to find the smallest circle,
in which the completely covered cells contains at least k points. Each time it extends the
circle by looking at the closest cell, of which the distance to the query point is defined as
Definition 6. The algorithm uses a heap to maintain the closest cell. When a cell is chosen
as the closest cell, the distances of its adjacent neighbors which haven’t been inserted in
the heap are pushed into the heap. The algorithm keeps extending the circle until the total
number of points in the circle is at least k points. For example, in Figure 5 there are four
cells completely covered by the circle, which contains 2+1+2+4=9 points in total. Therefore, this is the smallest circle which definitely covers 9 points based on the density map.
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Figure 5: Calculating Points in the Circle
The initial higher bound square range is defined as the bounding box of the final circle.
Algorithm 4 Preprocessing of Binary Search
1: procedure F INDING C OMAPCT I NTIAL R ANGE(density map P, Value k)
2:
Hk ← new min-heap of pairs < distance, id >
◃ id is the position of the cell
3:
Insert one pair of < distance, id0 > ◃ id0 is the id of the cell that covers the query
point.
4:
sum ← 0
5:
radius ← 0
6:
while sum < k do
7:
Pop up the top element of the heap Hk
◃ Top element is the closest cell
8:
radius ← distance of the cell to the query point
9:
num ← number of points of the closest cell
10:
sum ← sum + num
11:
Insert into Hk for the cells adjacent to the closest cell which have not been
inserted into the H before
12:
end while
13:
return radius
14: end procedure

Complexity. In the best case, the algorithm only needs to include one closest cell, which
contains more than k points. In worst case, this algorithm will possibly iterate all cells,
when the density map is extremely sparse. If the points are roughly uniformly distributed,
with each cell contains m points, then the average cost will be k/m iterations.
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Figure 6: Illustrate of the attack on the MBR of narrow ranges.

4.6 Attacks on kNN Queries
In the kNN-R algorithm, the proxy server prepares the initial ranges S (L1 ) and S (Lm ) and
submits them to the cloud. A secured range query consists of two parts: the MBR of the
transformed polyhedron and the 2(d + 2) dimensional range conditions uT Θi u ≤ 0, i =
1 . . . 2(d + 2). However, one may concern that the MBR of the secured S (L1 ) , which is a
narrow range encoded for the query point, may reveal the query point and the information
about the RASP perturbation parameters.
We describe the S (L1 ) -based attack with the case of one-dimensional data. Assume the query point is x, x ∈ R. It is extended to (x, 1, v)T with random value v in the range (0, D), and
then transformed with an invertible 3 × 3 matrix A. For simplicity of analysis, we consider
that the low-bound range uses the exact value of x, which is S (L1 ) =([x, x], [1, 1], [0, D]) in practice, we use ([x − δ, x + δ], [1, 1], [0, D]), where δ is a small positive value. Such
a range is just a line segment in the extended space (Left subfigure of Figure 6). With the
transformation A, the transformed line segment has a cubic MBR (right subfigure of Figure
6).
Furthermore, we assume that the attacker knows (x, 1, 0)T is mapped to β, one of the vertices of the MBR, β = (b1 , b2 , b3 )T . And the attacker manages to get a number of such pairs:
(xi , 1, 0)T → βi for i = 1 . . . m (corresponding to the level 3 knowledge). Let the first row
T
). Let B1 be the first
of A be A1 , X = ((x1 , 1, 0)T , . . . , (xm , 1, 0)T ), and B = (β1T , . . . , βm

row of B. Then, we have A1 X = B1 . The key is whether the attacker can solve the linear
equation to find A1 .
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We show that the attacker is impossible to solve the linear equation. Because X has the
rows of constant ‘1’ and ‘0’, its rank ≤ 1. Based on the rank-nullity theorem [17], the
solution to A1 X = 0 is A1 = a1 uT1 + a2 uT2 , where u1 and u2 are the basis of the null space
of X; a1 and a2 can be any random numbers. Thus, the attacker cannot determine a unique
solution for A1 X = B1 . This analysis shows that the RASP perturbation is also resilient to
the attack on the MBRs of narrow ranges.

5

Experiments

In this section, we present four sets of experimental results to show the unique features of
the proposed kNN-R approach: (1) Comparative study on the k minimum range algorithm
and the (k, δ)-range algorithm; (2) Cost reduction brought by the preprocessing algorithm;
(3) overall performance of query processing and the relationship between the APC setting
and performance; (4) Performance and precision advantages over the Casper approach [19]
and the dot-product based kNN approach [22].

5.1 Setup
Two datasets are used in experiments: (1) a synthetic multidimensional dataset that draws
100,000 samples uniformly at random from the domain [0, 50000] for each dimension;
(2)North East dataset, that contains 123593 two dimensional addresses, downloaded from
the RTree Portal website (http://www.rtreeportal.org/). In order to index encrypted data, we
use an R*-tree implementation provided by Dr. Hadjieleftheriou at AT&T Lab. We set the
block size to 4KB and 100 records per block. In each individual experiment we generate
1000 queries uniformly at random from the domain. All experiments are performed in a PC
with an Intel i5 CPU and 6GB RAM.
The dot-product approach [22] has to scan the entire database to find kNN, while our approach can utilize the index built on the encrypted data for range queries. If we use the
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number of block accesses of the database to represent the cost of query, the cost of the dotproduct approach would be proportional to the total number of data blocks in the database.
The Casper approach uses cloaking boxes to hide both the original data points in the database and the query points. Based on the description in the paper [19], we implement the
1NN query processing algorithm for the experiment.

5.2 Scalability of Proxy Server
Table 1 shows that in contrast with the service provider, the time cost from the proxy server
is much smaller and more scalable if the number of queries is increased. So it is reasonable
to provide a proxy server in the system architecture without influencing the scalability of
the system.
No. of queries
Proxy for Uniform Data
Proxy for Real Data
Cloud Server for Uniform Data
Cloud Server for Real Data

1K
0.01
0.01
1.01
1.33

3K
0.02
0.05
3.09
3.98

5K
0.03
0.05
5.34
6.43

7K
0.04
0.07
6.58
8.76

9K
0.08
0.09
8.77
12.28

Table 1: Comparison between Proxy and Server

5.3 k Minimum Range and (k, δ)-Range Algorithms
The E parameter in the k minimum range algorithm and the δ parameter in the (k, δ)-range
algorithm are the parameters determining the tradeoff between the performance and precision. By increasing E or δ, the algorithms needs less rounds to finish, while the precision of
the precision decreases. In this set of experiments, we want to understand how the setting
of these parameters affects the performance and the result precision.
Figure 7 shows the effect of E setting to the k minimum range algorithm. When E is smaller
than 1 (or 1/50000 = 0.002% of the domain size), the precision doesn’t change much - it
simply wastes the time of server processing. The optimal precisions are around 0.5, matching with our analysis in Section 4. When E is larger than 1, the precision starts dropping.
With E = 100 or 0.2% of the domain size, the precision is reduced by about a half of the
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Figure 7: Performance and result precision for different E setting of the k minimum range
algorithm.
optimal precision. On the other hand the average number of rounds in binary search steadily decreases as E increases. The optimal setting seems at E = 10, where the precision does
not reduce much but the cost is reduced to less than 10 rounds.
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Figure 8: Performance and result precision for different δ setting of the (k, δ)-range algorithm.
Figure 8 shows the effect of δ setting to the (k, δ)-range algorithm. As δ becomes larger, the
precision and the number of rounds decrease. At δ = 0 the precision and the performance
are very similar to the setting of E = 10 for the k minimum range algorithm. Comparing
these two algorithms, it might be tricky to select appropriate E to avoid wasting server
processing resources, while it is easier to set δ for the (k, δ)-range algorithm.
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5.4 Cost Reduction with Preprocessing
Another key factor for the inner range search algorithms is the initial higher bound range
SLm . The naive method as we mentioned in Section 4.5 is to use a square range covering
the entire domain space. In comparison, our preprocessing algorithm will reduce the range
significantly and thus decrease the cost of query processing.
To clearly present the results, we use the rate between the length of the initial range SLm and
the entire domain to represent the size of SLm . And we use the log number of block accesses
(log10(blocks)) and the wall clock time (Time) to represent the cost of the k minimum range
algorithm. Table 2 shows the numbers based on the average over 1000 random queries on
the database of 100 thousands of points. The initial range is dramatically reduced from
100% to 3%; the number of block accesses and the server processing time are reduced in
magnitudes.
Data& setting
Uniform/no preprocessing
Uniform/preprocessing
NorthEast/no preprocessing
NorthEast/preprocessing

SLm size
100%
3%
100%
3%

log10(blocks)
7.70
5.57
8.00
5.83

Time (sec)
79
1.35
141
1.70

Table 2: Cost reduction brought by the preprocessing algorithm.

5.5 kNN-R vs Linear Scan Approaches
Many secure approaches cannot use indices for query processing, which results in very
poor performance. For example, dot-product approach [22] encodes the points with random
projections. It tries to recover dot-products in query processing for distance comparison.
The way it encodes data disallows the index-based query processing. Without the aid of
indices, processing a kNN query will have to scan the entire database. We compare the
number of block accesses and the server times to show that our approach is much more
efficient especially handling very large databases because the underlying RASP approach
can use indices in query processing.
We use the database of 100 thousands of data points and 1000 randomly selected queries
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for this experiment. Similarly, we use the log number of block accesses (log10(blocks)) and
the wall clock time (Time) to represent the cost in Table ??. The kNN-R results are from
the experiments of k minimum range algorithm. The linear scan works on plaintext data,
which just gives a rough comparison to show how large the performance difference can be.
Data& setting
Uniform/Linear Scan
Uniform/kNN-R
NorthEast/Linear Scan
NorthEast/kNN-R

log10(blocks)
9.06
5.57
9.06
5.83

Time (sec)
195
1.35
195
1.70

Table 3: Performance comparison on linear scan and index-aided kNN-R processing.

5.6 Comparing kNN-R with the Casper Approach
In this set of experiments, we compare our approach with the Casper approach with a focus on the tradeoff between the data confidentiality and the query result precision (which
indicates the workload of the inhouse proxy). We will formally define the amount of confidentiality preserved by the Casper approach based on the size of cloaking box, and then
show the relationship between the preserved confidentiality and the precision of query result.
The Casper approach [19] uses cloaking boxes to hide the exact values of the data points
and the query points. To find the nearest neighbor the Casper algorithm aims to find an
extended area to guarantee that the points in this area must contain the nearest neighbor.
Because the extended area has some irrelevant points as well as our method does, the most
important comparison to evaluate these two methods is the precision.
Data confidentiality in the Casper approach is guaranteed by the size of cloaking box,
which, however, affects the efficiency of query processing and the precision of query results. For the convenience of presentation, we assume each dimension has the same length
of domain and each cloaking box is square box. We can conveniently represent the size
of cloaking box with the rate, r, between the edge length of the cloaking box and the size of the entire domain. Next, we try to derive the confidentiality with the confidentiality
measure APC defined in Section 2.4. Thus, if the length of domain is D and the center of
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Figure 9: The effect of security setting to result precision for Casper and kNN-R.
the cloaking box at dimension i is C, the i-th dimension value x is uniformly distributed
in [C − rD/2, C + rD/2]. Furthermore, the attacker can only randomly guess the original point based on the cloaking box. Therefore, the random guess x̂ has the same uniform
distribution over [C − rD/2, C + rD/2]. Thus, the difference x − x̂ follows a so-called
triangle distribution [] over [C − rD, C + rD], of which the variance is r2 D2 /6, i.e., the
√
standard deviation σ = rD/ 6. For normalized distribution of x − x̂ (triangle distribution
√ √
√
over [− 6, 6]), we can choose δ = 6 to cover the entire domain with confidence 1.
Therefore, we have
AP CCasper,r = 2δσ/D = 2r,

(10)

with confidence 1 in terms of the random guess attack.
Figure 9 shows that when the Casper’s APC, i.e., 2r is increased from 0.4% to 2%, the
precision dramatically drops from 62% to 13% for the uniform data and 43% to 10% for
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the NE data. Since the kNN-R’s APC is almost controlled by the standard deviation, σ,
of the noise component, we change σ from 0.1 to 0.5 for normalized data distributions in
N (0, 1). In comparison, Figure 9 shows the precision of kNN-R approach keeps steady
around 56% for the uniform data and 44% for the NE data when we increase the standard
deviation of noise. In addition, the increased APC does not affect the performance of query
processing. With E = 10 for the k minimum range algorithm, it takes about 8 rounds and
0.8 seconds to finish 1000 queries.

6

Related work

We propose to evaluate an outsourced service based on the CPEL criteria: data Confidentiality, query Privacy, Efficient query processing, and Low inhouse workload. We discuss
some of the related work based on these criteria.
Distance-recoverable encryption is the most intuitive method for preserving the kNN relationship. However, this type of encryption is vulnerable to known plaintext-ciphertext attack,
as discussed in [22, 14, 6]. Wong et al. [22] notices that comparing dot products instead of
distances is sufficient to find kNN. However, this approach depends on the strong assumption that attackers cannot know plaintext-ciphertext query pairs, which is impossible in
practice. Once the attacker knows one pair of plaintext-ciphertext query it is straightforward to reconstruct the key transformation matrix. In addition, the encrypted data cannot
be indexed, which results in low server efficiency.
Hu et al. [10] addresses the query privacy problem and requires the authorized query users,
the data owner, and the cloud to collaboratively process kNN queries. It makes implicit
assumption that authorized query users do not collude with the cloud to breach the security. Collusion is possible when the curious cloud provider disguises as a client to submit
queries. Furthermore, most computation depends on the query user’s local processing and
multiple rounds of interaction with the cloud server. The cloud server only aids query processing, which doesn’t meet the principle of letting the cloud take most responsibility of
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query processing. Papadopoulos et al. [20] also focuses on the query privacy problem, specifically, location privacy, with private information retrieval methods [7]. This approach
does not consider protecting the confidentiality of data.
SpaceTwist [24] proposed a method to query kNN with the encrypted users’ positions for
location privacy. But it didn’t keep the data encrypted when it comes to sensitive data. The
Casper approach [19] considers both data confidentiality and query privacy. It cloaks each
data point and query point with a rectangle. The point can be anywhere within the cloaking
box. Therefore, the size of cloaking box determines the level of protection. An algorithm
is designed to find the nearest neighbor of the cloaked query point from the cloaked data
points. Because of cloaking the query result may contain irrelevant points. Depending on
the size of the domain, an acceptable size of cloaking might be large for some applications.
Our experiment shows that the query result precision drops dramatically with the slightly
increased size of cloaking.
Yiu et al. [15] uses a hierarchical space division method to encode spatial data points. It
partitions the data space into blocks. In each block linear transformations are applied to
x-axis and y-axis, respectively. Note that this transformation does not change the order of
the x and y axis values in each block. Consequently, the dimensional order is preserved
for the entire domain. The security weaknesses of order preserving encryption have been
thoroughly discussed in several places [2, 4].

7

Conclusion

We propose to study an outsourced service based on the CPEL criteria: data Confidentiality, query Privacy, Efficient query processing, and Low inhouse workload. With the CPEL
criteria in mind, we develop the kNN-R approach for secure outsourced kNN query service.
The kNN-R approach takes advantage of fast and secure RASP range query processing to
implement kNN query processing. It can find high precision kNN results and also minimize the interactions between the cloud server and the inhouse client. High precision kNN
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results and minimized interactions result in low inhouse workload. We have conducted a
thorough security analysis on data confidentiality and query privacy. Compared to the related approaches, the kNN-R approach achieves a better balance over the CPEL criteria.
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